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Abstract 
Globally, state failure is hugely costly, in terms of lost output and the high costs 
imposed by failing states on their neighbours. This paper examines the cost of failing 
states in the Pacific. The Pacific region differs from other regions: since its countries 
are islands the neighbourhood spillovers that normally generate these costs do not 
apply. The cost of state failure for an island is much lower than for other states, but 
state failure is more costly to the state itself, as opposed to its neighbours, if the state 
is an island. This may be due to the greater openness of islands, implying greater 
flight of financial and human capital. Because neighbours are not directly affected by 
state failure in the Pacific, any possible interventions should be centred on the 
humanitarian concern. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we estimate the costs of a ‘failing state’ and apply this concept 
specifically to the island states in the Pacific Ocean. This study draws closely on the 
results obtained in our companion paper on the cost of failing states globally 
(Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007). There we estimated the total cost of failing 
states at around $276bn per year, although of course any such estimate can only be 
highly approximate. 
 
States can ‘fail’ in two distinct senses. The most basic role of the state is to provide 
physical security to its citizens through maintaining a monopoly of organised violence 
within the society. Where the government fails to do this and rival organisations of 
violence emerge, the state descends into civil war. However, in the modern world the 
demands legitimately placed upon the state extend beyond this basic function of 
security. Governments in all modern societies play some role as regulators of private 
economic activity, and as suppliers of public goods such as transport infrastructure, 
health and education. The quality of regulation and public goods is important for the 
capacity of citizens to earn a living. Increasingly, as globalisation makes economic 
activity more mobile between countries, the quality of government matters in a 
relative rather than an absolute sense: governm nts that are much worse than others 
are likely to lose economic activities and this will rebound upon their citizens.  Hence, 
a state can fail because its government provides a quality of regulation and public 
goods which is markedly worse than that provided by other governments. Henceforth, 
we will refer to the provision of regulation and public goods by the shorthand term 
‘governance’. 
 
Our paper is concerned with the costs of state failure. Evidently, the costs of failure 
arising from organised violence are likely to be different from the costs arising from a 
failure of governance. We measure each separately. In estimating the cost of failure to 
the countries of the Pacific there are two possible approaches. One, which is the route 
commonly taken by country specialists, is to focus on a few countries in detail. Our 
approach is radically different but complementary to this country-focused approach. 
We start from our global analysis, and investigate whether there are reasons to believe 
that the Pacific is distinctive from the global pattern. The major advantage of this 
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approach is that because global analysis provides far more observations, we are able 
to use more sophisticated and robust techniques for estimating the ‘counterfactual’: 
how societies would have evolved had they not ‘failed’. The risk in the approach is 
that it might miss distinctiveness: reasons why global patterns do not apply in the 
Pacific. Part of our analysis is designed to do just this. Indeed, we find that in one 
very important respect the Pacific is distinctive, so that the costs of a failing state are 
considerably lower than implied by the global pattern.  
 
Our approach is complementary to a country-focused approach but not an alternative 
to it. Comparative global statistical analysis necessarily omits much of importance 
that can only be understood by serious immersion into area-specific knowledge. 
Hence, the limitations of our analysis must be understood alongside its strengths. 
 
Failing states generate many different types of costs. If there is large-scale organised 
violence people are killed, people flee, people get sick as diseases spread, and the 
economy is damaged.  Many of these costs are difficult to quantify and attempts to do 
so would consequently be contentious. Rather than make inevitably fragile estimates 
of the costs of incommensurable effects, we confine our analysis to the readily 
quantified costs of failure, focusing primarily upon the costs to the economy. These 
estimates are therefore a lower bound to the true costs and should be understood as 
such rather than as a central estimate of all likely costs. Of course, as economic costs 
are estimated with error and these unquantifiable costs will be reflected in economic 
performance, there is not necessarily a serious underestimate. 
 
In our total cost estimate (Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007) we distinguish three 
distinct costs of a failing state: the costs to citizens of such states of poor policy and 
governance, the costs to these citizens of civil war, and the cost of both these types of 
failure to neighbours. The largest component of the cost of failing states is the effects 
on their neighbours: 86 per cent of the total costs of failing states are those inflicted 
on other countries. Around 12 per cent of the total cost is borne by the citizens of the 
failing state and the additional risk of future civil war accounts for about 2 per cent of 
the total cost. 
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 5 
In this paper we focus specifically on the island states of the Pacific. Out of the 11 
Pacific Islands on which we have some data, two have been categorised as failing 
during the period 1977-2004: Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. As 
discussed below, Fiji may have become failing towards the end of the period. In 
Section 2 we discuss our definition of state failure and apply it to the Pacific island 
states. In Section 3 we discuss the basis for external intervention. In Section 4 we 
estimate the consequences of state failure for the economy of the failing state itself. 
First we summarise the global pattern and then investigate whether costs are likely to 
be distinctive in the islands of the Pacific. In Section 5 we turn to the consequences 
for neighbours. Again, we start from the global pattern and then investigate whether 
the islands of the Pacific are different. In Section 6 we bring our analysis together, 
applying it to the costs of state failure among the islands of the Pacific. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. Defining a failing state: an application to the Pacific 
 
Our definition of state failure focuses on the provision of security and the provision of 
public goods, i.e. development opportunities. As an initial assessment of the situation 
in the Pacific we present recent economic data for eleven islands in Table 1. We 
concentrate our analysis on fully independent states and do not consider territories 
such as for example Guam and New Caledonia.1  
---- Table 1 about here ---- 
 
In terms of population Papua New Guinea is the largest of the eleven Pacific states; 
with over 6 million inhabitants it is over six times larger than the next biggest country, 
East Timor. Although it also has the largest economy in terms of GDP, the per capita 
income of US$ 990 is well below the average for the region. Other poor countries are 
the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and the poorest is East Timor (US$ 371). As a 
comparison the World Bank estimates the average per capita income for the East Asia 
– Pacific region at $2,320. Growth rates for the eleven countries have in general been 
poor, with the exception of Samoa and Tonga. In some cases the growth rates have 
been extremely volatile over the past decade: Fiji’s growth rates varied between 8 per 
cent and -5 per cent. The region is highly dependent on aid; in East Timor and 
Micronesia the share of overseas development assistance (ODA) makes up about 45 
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per cent of GNI.2 While these descriptive data are interesting they do not answer the 
question of which states have been failing. First, the data are not informative about the 
security situation and second, countries may be poor due to other reasons than state 
failure. We thus turn to a more detailed discussion of state failure for the time period 
which we can examine in a global data set, namely 1977-2004. 
 
Our concepts of state failure, organised violence and bad governance, are continua. 
The scale of organised violence in a society can range from being a minor irritant, as 
in youth gangs in a city, to a devastating scourge, as with the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia; similarly, limitations in the quality of governance can range from 
occasional malfunctions in implementation to gross systematic deficiencies.  
However, it is often helpful analytically to impose thresholds that thereby create 
distinct categories of failing states: where the level of non-government organised 
violence exceeds some level, or where the quality of governance falls short of some 
level. We have done this globally, and we apply these same concepts to the Pacific.  
 
For organised violence we use the standard definition of a civil war from the well-
known database Correlates of War, which adopts a threshold of at least one thousand 
combat-related deaths during a year. An advantage of using the standard definition is 
that we are then able to use data sets which have classified countries globally 
according to it. According to this definition, there have been no episodes of civil war 
in the Pacific Islands. The war in East Timor, which led to her independence, is coded 
as a civil war in Indonesia. The Uppsala/Prio Armed Conflict Database (ACD) lists 
two episodes of minor armed conflict – more than 25 combat-related deaths per year – 
for Papua New Guinea: 1989 and 1990 and from 1992 until 1996 (see Table 2). The 
intensity of the conflict was never more than 1,000 in any given year and the conflict 
is classified as internal. 
 
Recall that by bad governance we mean that the provision of public goods is 
inadequate relative to the underlying capabilities of the society to pay for them, and 
that regulatory policies are dysfunctional. Economic policies and governance differ 
massively between countries. Poor policies and governance are themselves the 
consequence of other factors such as particular configurations of interest groups. 
These deeper factors may reduce growth directly as well as via policies and 
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governance. As a result, an apparent improvement that is divorced from underlying 
change may have only modest effects on growth. For example, interest groups may 
use other instruments to achieve their objectives and these may also be detrimental to 
growth. The poor policies and governance that define failing states should thus 
probably be regarded as the observable manifestations of a dysfunctional society. 
They can be thought of as lying on a continuum determined by their likely 
consequences for growth and poverty reduction. A government fails if it adopts 
policies and governance that persistently fall below some low threshold and so inflicts 
slow growth or even absolute economic decline on its citizens.  
 
We adopt the World Bank criterion for Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) 
as defining such a threshold (World Bank, 2002) and combine it with a concept of 
persistence of such poor policies and governance. To define failure, the World Bank 
uses the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score. The CPIA 
assesses economic policies and structural reforms since 1977 in 136 developing 
countries on a scale from 1 to 6.3 Our sample of fragile states corresponds to the lower 
range of the CPIA: those countries with a CPIA lower than 2.5. To meet our criterion 
of persistence a country must fall below 2.5 for a continuous period of at least four 
years. This is designed to exclude from the category of failing states those that merely 
suffer a temporary crash. Analogously, we wish to retain in the category of failing 
states those that having a CPIA lower than 2.5 temporarily or weakly improve policies 
and governance a little above the threshold. A country exits the category of failing 
state only if it achieves a decisive improvement, by which we mean sustaining a level 
of policies and governance clearly above 3.5 for at least two years. Among the Pacific 
islands, only Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are failing according to our 
definition. Neither Papua New Guinea nor the Solomon Islands managed to exit the 
category of failing states during the period under analysis.4  
 
---- Table 2 about here ---- 
 
How does our classification of state failure in the Pacific compare to other 
categorisations? A few security and development organisations publish lists of failing 
states and in Table 2 we compare their assessments. The Political Instability Task 
Force (PITF) definition of state failure centres on security aspects: a state is failing if 
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 8 
the country suffers a revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime changes or 
genocides and politicides. For the eleven Pacific states PITF lists one ethnic war in 
Papua New Guinea. For Fiji the PITF lists two episodes of regime change (1987 and 
2006) and for the Solomon Islands one (2000-2003).  
 
The definition of state failure used by The Fund for Peace is a broad one; it uses 12 
social, economic, political, and military indicators in order to assess a state’s 
vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration. For 2007 Somalia 
received the lowest score and was thus ranked as the country most at risk of state 
failure. Norway received the highest score and was thus ranked as the country least at 
risk of state failure. We list the combined score for each of the Pacific countries, and 
provide their rank among the 177 listed countries. The country judged at the highest 
risk of state failure is East Timor (rank 25), followed by the Solomon Islands (rank 
30).5   
 
Based on various different definitions East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands tend to be classified as failing states. Since East Timor only became 
fully recognised in 2002 we did not have sufficient data to include the country in our 
panel analysis, but Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands experienced sustained 
periods of poor governance and thus enter our analysis as failed states. A further two 
states have experienced poor governance, Fiji and Vanuatu, but the episodes were not 
of sufficient length to classify them as failed states. Until recently the CPIA scores 
were not publicly available, but we can show the most recent assessment in Table 3. 
 
---- Table 3 about here ---- 
 
The last column lists the average CPIA score for the six Pacific countries for which 
data were available. As the last two rows indicate, on average their scores are slightly 
lower (3.14) than the ones of other aid recipients (3.27). These average scores are 
calculated from 16 criteria. These are grouped in four clusters: (A) economic 
management; (B) structural policies; (C) policies for social inclusion and equity; and 
(D) public sector management and institutions. Further details on these clusters are 
listed in Appendix 1. This breakdown gives us some indication why the World Bank 
rates governance as poor. Clusters C and D, policies for social inclusion and equity 
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and public sector management and institutions, tend to receive lower scores. Lower 
than average scores are highlighted in bold in Table 3. Although clusters C and D are 
also lower for all aid recipients, the numbers for the Pacific countries suggest that it is 
in particular the low scores on the criteria for cluster C which reduce the CPIA. Thus, 
with the exception of Tonga, the Pacific islands score low on social inclusion and 
equity which is based on an assessment of: gender equality, equity of public resource 
use, building human resources, social protection and labour policies and institutions 
for environmental sustainability. Ware (2005) offers an explanation why governance 
is so poor in this social dimension. She argues that the high population growth in the 
region outstrips economic growth and employment opportunities. This leads to 
pressures on land, sea and other natural resources which are currently not mediated by 
social arrangements, mainly due to government failure. 
 
None of the countries currently has an average score of below 2.5, which is the 
benchmark for the severe LICUS definition. However, East Timor and the Solomon 
Islands have very low scores of about 2.7. East Timor is a young state; after a long 
armed fight against Indonesian rule the population voted in favour of independence in 
1999. A number of UN missions were deployed and this post-conflict country is one 
of the poorest nations. East Timor has suffered from recent riots and in 2006 Australia 
and other nations sent troops to stop the viol nce. Thus, the security situation is 
precarious and the economy suffers from structural weaknesses (Lundahl and 
Sjöholm, 2009). Population growth is high, there is only a tiny modern private sector, 
subsistence agriculture dominates the economy, the oil sector generates revenue but 
no local jobs and the country remains dependent on foreign aid (on average 40 per 
cent of GNI since 2002). All of these characteristics indicate a risk of state failure. 
 
The Solomon Islands have also experienced organised violent conflict. The country 
consists of more than 1,000 islands with little sense of unity or nationhood. In 1999 
civil unrest on the main island of Guadalcanal broke out. This conflict is often 
referred to as ‘ethnic tension’ between the Guales and the immigrant Malaitians. 
However, Dinnen (2002) argues that this conflict is not only due to ethnic differences 
but that various actors use this disorder to pursue their own political and personal 
agenda. Despite the Townsville Peace Agreement in 2000 and an Australian led 
security operation in 2003 the security situation remains fragile. In 2006 rioting in the 
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capital followed allegations that the prime minister had received bribes from a 
Chinese businessman. Hundreds of foreigners, mainly Chinese, had to be evacuated.6 
As discussed above the Solomon Islands are also very poor with an average per capita 
income of about $745 in 2007. The security and development situation remain 
uncertain and we consider the Solomon Islands as a failing state. 
 
Papua New Guinea has a record of highly fragile institutions and poor economic 
policy. Its aggregate CPIA has ranged between 2.3 and 3.4 during the eighties and 
nineties and the country did not manage to turn around within the period under study. 
Despite the fact that Papua New Guinea is a resource rich country, around one third of 
the population lives under the $2 per day poverty line. Moreover, Gibson and Olivia 
(2002) estimate that it would take on average 20 years for poor Papua New Guineans 
to escape from poverty, and even longer for the rural poor who tend to face slower 
growth rates. Adding to these structural weaknesses and poor governance, Papua New 
Guinea has had to face the secessionist tensions of the copper rich island Bougainville 
(1987-1997). This conflict opposed the government to the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army led by Francis Ona, and is estimated to have caused between 10,000 and 15,000 
fatalities. A peace agreement led to the establishment of an Autonomous Bougainville 
Government.  
  
Among the Pacific island states that may be classified as failing, Fiji is probably the 
most contentious. The country experienced four coups d’état (May and October 1987, 
2000, 2006). The economic performance of Fiji has suffered from this political 
instability. As noted by Gounder (1999, 2002) Fiji has experienced slow growth and 
an exodus of its skilled labour force since the 1987 coups. The coups induced 
uncertainty, notably relating to land ownership, which had a negative impact on 
private investment. The coups d’état in Fiji reflect the ethnic tensions the Fiji islands 
have to deal with. With a population mainly composed of native Fijians (Melanesians, 
54.3%) and Indo-Fijians (38.1%) Fiji is ethnically polarised. Gounder (2004) clearly 
highlights the differences in policies for these two ethnic groups and their likely 
implications in terms of sub-optimal policy choices in many areas. While the CPIA 
rating of the World Bank for Fiji never fell below 2.5 and averaged 3.1 during 1977-
2004, Fiji’s economic and political situation gives cause to concern. In April 2009, the 
Court of Appeal judged the 2006 coup d’état against the democratic government of 
Page 10 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 11 
Laisenia Qarase as illegal. Commodore Bainimarama who took over power in 2006 
resigned, but president Iloilo suspended the Constitution and shortly after re-
appointed Commodore Bainimarama as Interim Prime Minister.7 
 
While East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji have different 
histories of violence, they have some common characteristics which explain their 
difficulties. Ware (2005) provides an excellent overview of the security situation in 
the Pacific. She argues that the region experiences high population growth which puts 
pressure on the predominant sectors, namely subsistence agriculture and fishing. 
Many young people migrate to the capital cities but are unable to find jobs there. High 
youth unemployment rates generate a large number of disaffected young men who can 
be recruited for civil unrest.  
  
3. What are the limits to sovereignty? 
 
In part a quantification of the costs of failing states is of interest because this is a 
necessary first step towards a cost-benefit analysis of remedies. However, the costs of 
a failing state also have a more fundamental significance. Although the term ‘failing 
state’ is sometimes used loosely, its distinctive meaning is that the government of 
such a state should not have the usual untrammelled rights of national sovereignty. 
The limits to government sovereignty come through three distinct types of argument. 
The first, exemplified in the new United Nations concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect,8 is that, beyond some point, if a government harms its own citizens this 
breaches international norms of acceptable standards and the international community 
has an obligation to intervene to arrest the harm.  
 
The second is that poverty reduction is not seen as an exclusively national 
responsibility. The Monterrey Consensus of 2002 formally recognises the 
responsibilities of international aid donors as well as recipients.9 The UN norm is that 
governments of OECD countries should contribute 0.7 per cent of their national 
income as aid and there is a counterpart responsibility of the governments of recipient 
countries to manage their affairs in such a way as to be conducive to poverty 
reduction. However, the threshold of policies and governance necessary for poverty 
reduction is currently less well defined than that for aid.  
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The third, exemplified in the international treaties on global public goods such as 
Kyoto, is that a state does not have the right to harm the citizens of other countries. 
Thus, if failing states generate large costs for neighbours, this gives the neighbouring 
states some rights of intervention to curtail the harm. A failing state would, in this 
case, be a regional public bad, needing regional collective action to resolve it 
analogous, for example, to the regional water authorities that override national 
sovereignty where a river flows through several countries.  
 
The implications for national sovereignty versus international and regional 
intervention thus rest, to an extent, on who bears the costs of a failing state. If the 
costs of failure are essentially borne by the citizens of the failing state, the basis for 
external intervention is a breach in international norms. Where this occurs the 
authorising environment for intervention is, in some sense, the global community. The 
actual operation of intervention may be devolved from the international community to 
some regional actor, but the latter is empowered by the international norms. In 
contrast, if the costs of failure are substantially borne by neighbours of a failing state, 
then the neighbours have a direct right of intervention that does not rest on any actual 
or notional global authorisation. By the principle of subsidiarity, regions have the 
prime responsibility for organising the provision of their own regional public goods, 
and correspondingly for curtailing their own regional public bads. Hence, a critical 
issue for the Pacific region is who bears the costs of failure.  
 
4. The Costs of State Failure to the Citizens of Failing States 
 
We now estimate the costs of state failure to the citizens of failing states. Our 
approach is to quantify the loss to growth resulting from each of the types of state 
failure, and then to cumulate these losses over the period during which the state is 
failing. In Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) we set out in detail how we estimate 
these costs. Here we provide a brief overview of our estimation results for the global 
sample before extending the analysis to the context of the Pacific Islands. 
 
Based on a comprehensive global sample of countries over the period 1974-2001 we 
estimate a standard growth regression and introduce into it a dummy variable for 
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failing states. Because we wish to have a single regression that can be used for all the 
costs to be considered, we confine the present concept of failing states to those which 
are at peace, and introduce a second dummy for those which are in civil war. We also 
include dummy variables for neighbourhood spillovers. These other dummy variables 
will be discussed in subsequent sections. Our core regression is OLS. However, to 
check the robustness of the results we repeat the regression using GMM.10 The results 
of both regressions are reported in Table 4. The GMM results coincide with those of 
the OLS: being a failing state at peace significantly reduces the growth rate by 2.6 per 
cent relative to being at peace with adequate policies and governance. The 90 per cent 
confidence interval around this estimate, which we can use to provide confidence 
intervals around our estimates of cost, is also shown in the Table. The last column of 
Table 4 also shows the results when using the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
instead of the Penn World Tables data. This is because more islands are included in 
the sample when using the WDI dataset, which is thus used in the remainder of the 
paper.   
 
---- Table 4 about here ---- 
 
Having arrived at the annual cost in terms of reduced growth, the remaining 
dimension of cost is the likely persistence of these losses. Our criteria of persistence 
of the definition of state failure have excluded both temporary crashes that swiftly 
rebound and temporary improvements that quickly collapse, but they do not 
necessarily imply that the phase of inadequate policies and governance is prolonged. 
Chauvet and Collier (2008) use a logit regression to estimate the probability that a 
failing state will achieve a decisive exit from the condition. A few characteristics 
make exit significantly less likely: a small population and a low incidence of 
secondary education. In effect, turnaround is made harder if there are in absolute 
terms few well-educated people in the society. Compared with other developing 
countries the typical failing state indeed has both of the characteristics that predict 
persistence. The typical failing state has a population of only 15 million as compared 
with 42 million for elsewhere, and a far lower proportion of its population have 
completed secondary education: 3 per cent against 12 per cent for other developing 
countries. At the mean of failing state characteristics the predicted annual probability 
of exit is a mere 1.7 per cent. In turn, this probability can be converted into the 
mathematical expectation of the duration of being a failing state: in effect, how long 
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the typical failing state will remain in the condition. The expectation is 59 years. 
Hence, the typical low-income failing state will indeed experience a prolonged period 
in which policies and governance are inadequate and so a high incidence of poverty is 
likely to be prolonged.  
 
We then combine the annual loss of growth with our estimate of the probability of a 
decisive turnaround from the condition, namely 1.7 per cent per year. For example, if 
a failing state is very fortunate, in the first year it will lose 2.6 per cent of GDP 
relative to the counterfactual of adequate policies whereupon it will achieve a decisive 
turnaround. The ultimate costs of having been a failing state then depend upon what is 
assumed about post-turnaround recovery. At one extreme growth post-turnaround is 
merely the same as if the country had always had adequate policies. In this case the 
loss is perpetual: every year in the future the country is 2.6 per cent worse off than if 
it had not had the phase of inadequate policies and governance. We adopt the more 
hopeful, and probably more reasonable, assumption that during the recovery phase 
growth is unusually rapid: the economy recovers to where it would have been without 
the failing state phase, and the recovery takes as many years as that phase has lasted. 
The cost of having been a failing state is then the loss of GDP in each year until the 
economy attains the level it would have reached had it not been a failing state, 
discounted to the present. We adopt a discount rate of 5 per cent. We allow for the 
possibility of turnaround in each year, weighted by the probability that a turnaround 
will occur in that year, and sum across all of these possible paths of development. 
This generates the mathematical expectation of the discounted present value of the 
cost of being a failing state, viewed from the first year in which the country enters the 
condition. Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) provide the detailed calculation of the 
cost. Our central estimate of the costs of the typical failing state at peace is about five 
times their average GDP, with the 90 per cent confidence interval from the growth 
regression giving a range of 4.2 to 5.8 times their GDP.  
 
We now investigate whether the Pacific conforms to this global pattern. There are two 
ways in which a region might be distinctive from the global pattern, which we might 
think of as cultural and structural. A cultural account of distinctiveness would be that 
because of certain culturally-specific features of the Pacific the consequences of civil 
war or bad governance would be different from elsewhere. A structural account of 
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distinctiveness would be that because the economies of the Pacific had important 
structural differences from the global norm the consequences would be different. In 
principle it is possible to test for each of these statistically. Unfortunately, in the case 
of the Pacific it is not possible to check for the cultural account of difference. This is 
because there are too few failing states in the region to rely upon the statistical 
approach. It is therefore better for regional specialists to apply their judgment to this 
issue.  
 
It is far easier to incorporate structural as opposed to cultural distinctiveness in our 
statistical analysis. This is because, although all Pacific countries may have a 
particular structural characteristic that is less common elsewhere, they will not be the 
only countries that have this characteristic. The structural question is not whether 
Pacific islands are distinctive, but rather whether countries with this characteristic are 
distinctive, in which case the Pacific will be distinctive from the global average.  
 
One structural characteristic of Pacific countries that may have important 
consequences for the costs of being a failing state is that Pacific countries are islands. 
The cost of failure might be higher than average in small islands because they are 
atypically highly exposed to the global economy. In effect, far from being atypically 
isolated, small islands might be atypically integrated into global or regional markets. 
In particular, both capital and labour are likely to be highly mobile internationally in 
small islands (Ware, 2005). Such factor mobility would tend to increase the cost of 
bad governance because of the amplified exit that it entailed. Whether this is correct is 
entirely an empirical matter. To test it we create a dummy variable for countries that 
are islands and investigate whether its interaction with our dummy variable of failing 
states is significant in the growth regression. This will provide information as to 
whether failing island states suffer a different cost than other failing states. To avoid 
confusion with any direct effect of being an island on growth performance we also 
include the island dummy directly in the regression. We report this in Table 5, column 
1. The interaction term is significant and negative: island failing states suffer 
substantially larger losses from state failure than do other countries, around an 
additional 2.1 per cent reduction in the growth rate.  
 
---- Table 5 about here ---- 
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Before accepting this result we need to consider alternative explanations. One 
possibility is that it is due to a compositional effect: islands happen to suffer 
disproportionately from the more costly form of failure, namely organised violence. 
In fact, the opposite is the case, so this is not the explanation. There seems some basis 
for accepting that state failure in islands inflicts considerably larger costs on citizens 
than is the case elsewhere in the world. At the least, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the global cost is a lower bound to the cost for islands.  
 
If islands indeed suffer larger growth losses from bad governance then the present 
value of the costs is larger than the global estimate of five times annual GDP. The 
annual loss of growth of a failing island state is 3.9 per cent - adding the 2.1 per cent 
that is specific to island failing states to the 1.8 per cent of growth that a typical 
failing state at peace loses. Cumulating over years and discounting, this leads to a loss 
of 6.7 times the initial GDP. The 90 per cent confidence interval from the growth 
regression gives a range of 4.2 to 8.4 times the initial GDP.  
 
5. The Costs of State Failure to Neighbours 
 
We now turn to the second cost, namely that inflicted on neighbours. Neighbours 
suffer a variety of costs from failing states, but here we concentrate upon the 
economic losses. Globally, growth spills over onto neighbours. We now again 
investigate whether the Pacific conforms to this global pattern. As previously, the 
possible basis for exceptionalism is either cultural or structural. Again we cannot test 
for the cultural explanation, but we can test for the structural. We therefore turn to the 
structurally specific aspects of the Pacific. In what respects, if any, are the countries 
of the Pacific region likely to be structurally distinctive in a way that affects the 
spillover costs to neighbours? Again, the same characteristic stands out: the countries 
of the Pacific are islands, whereas most countries elsewhere are part of large 
landmasses. However, the reason why being an island might generate distinctive 
spillover effects is quite different from the reason why it might generate distinctive 
costs to citizens. The key issue is whether islands have neighbours, or more precisely 
whether proximate islands experience economic spillovers.  
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Spillovers might arise through several different routes. For example, compare 
spillovers arising from trade between neighbours and spillovers arising from the 
reputation of the neighbourhood. Trade between neighbours is likely to be less 
important for neighbours if they are islands than if they are spatially contiguous. 
Neighbouring islands are too similar to generate much trade with each other, and trade 
is limited by transport costs (most of the costs of sea transport are end-costs of 
loading and unloading). Hence, being proximate to another country by sea connection 
is of very little advantage in trade. By contrast, the costs of land transport are both 
much larger and more closely related to distance, hence proximity matters. If, 
however, the key spillover is through the reputation of the neighbourhood with 
investors, then physical contiguity may be unimportant. Pacific islands might be 
viewed as a group and investor risks and opportunities to an extent assessed 
collectively, so that reputation becomes a regional public good.   
 
To test for whether island neighbourhoods are distinctive, we first had to create the 
empirical concept of an island neighbourhood. We did this by recoding islands from 
having no neighbours, which is how they are conventionally treated, to being part of 
neighbourhoods within which each island was deemed to be a neighbour of every 
other island in the same region. Thus, in the case of the West Indies each island was 
treated as being in the ‘West Indies island neighbourhood’, and contiguous to every 
other member of this neighbourhood. We undertook such a coding globally, for each 
likely group of islands, including of course the Pacific islands. The resulting coding 
produced five groups of ‘island neighbourhoods’ (reported in Appendix 2). The total 
of 664 observations (in Table 5) comprise mostly islands in the Caribbean, Pacific and 
East Africa.  The island groups for South Europe and Asia are very small and of little 
economic significance (they may be geographically proximate as islands but have few 
if any economic ties). We therefore re-estimated Table 5 without South Europe and 
Asian islands (13 observations dropped);  the results presented in Appendix Table 3 
are very similar to those of Table 5. 
 
Having constructed these island neighbourhoods we then tested to see whether being 
the neighbour of other islands had similar effects to being a neighbour in the more 
conventionally defined sense of a contiguous land border. For this, we first pooled all 
the island neighbourhoods into the global data, thus reclassifying islands as having 
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neighbours instead of being isolated. Because the joint significance test of the 
coefficients of neighbours at war and at peace suggests that the two coefficients are 
not significantly different (last row of Table 5), we aggregate neighbours at peace and 
at war into one variable: in column 2 the neighbour variables excludes islands while 
in column 3 it includes islands. Then we introduce a dummy for being an island and 
interact it with the dummy for being the neighbour of a failing state (Table 5, column 
4). As previously, we controlled for the direct effects of being an island and a failing 
island state. Indeed, these effects were investigated as part of the same regression as 
that previously reported.  
 
The interaction of the island dummy with the dummy for being the neighbour of a 
failing state is significant and positive. Indeed, the coefficient is virtually identical, 
though with opposite sign, to that on being the neighbour of a failing state, a category 
which now includes the islands. These results suggest that islands do not have 
neighbours in the sense of regional spillover costs to growth from being a failing 
state.11  
 
 
 
 
An immediate implication is that the costs of a failing state in an island 
neighbourhood are essentially due to those costs that are borne by citizens of the 
failing state itself. Going back to our analysis of sovereignty, this implies that the 
basis for international action in failing island states is closer to the responsibility to 
protect than to the right to curtail regional public bads. In consequence, the rights of 
regional actors seem likely to flow more from devolved authority from global 
concerns about the breach of basic norms rather than directly from the right to protect 
one’s own citizens from spillovers.  
 
 
6. The costs of state failure in the Pacific 
 
The cost of state failure in the Pacific can now be built up from the incidence of state 
failure in the region and the cost per failing country. We take these in turn. 
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The incidence of state failure in the Pacific 
 
State failure has two manifestations: bad governance, and the collapse into internal 
violence. On our criteria discussed above, the incidence of bad governance in the 
Pacific islands is 19 per cent. This is identical to the global incidence of bad 
governance among low-income countries. This at least cautions against region-
specific pessimism. Further, among the eleven smaller Pacific Islands there has been 
no situation that meets the standard international criteria for a civil war. While this 
may imply that the Pacific region lives up to its name, unfortunately East Timor has 
had a long history of sustained violence with very high mortality, so the 
neighbourhood has clearly not been immune from violent conflict. The low incidence 
of civil war may be due to something especially favourable about the neighbourhood, 
or it may be structural: globally, countries with the structural characteristics of the 
Pacific islands may not experience civil war. We included a dummy variable for 
islands in the Collier, Hoeffler and ohner (2009) core regression and found it to be 
insignificant: island states do not seem either more or less conflict prone than other 
countries.  
 
Although the low incidence of civil war in the neighbourhood indeed appears most 
likely to be structural, it is not because they are islands but because they are small. 
Small societies seldom generate the scale of violence that exceeds the threshold 
definition of civil war even though they may suffer more modest levels of violence. 
The atypically high prevalence of resort to violence in East Timor is also consistent 
with an important feature of the global pattern: the conflict trap. Once a society has 
experienced violent conflict it is considerably more prone to further bouts of violence, 
partly due to the legacy of guns and organisations, and perhaps also due to the 
examples set by past experience. 
 
The total cost of state failure in the Pacific 
 
Finally, we turn to the calculation of the cost of failure in pacific islands. Recall that 
the cost of failure in fragile island states is essentially due to the costs that are borne 
by citizens of the failing island itself, since the loss of growth due to neighbours is nil. 
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On average, the loss of growth due to failure in islands implies a loss of 6.7 times the 
initial GDP.  
 
In our sample, two pacific islands enter into the fragile state category: Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands. With a population of 4.3 million people in 1998-
2004, Papua New Guinea is more than 10 times bigger than the Solomon Islands 
(378,000). So is its average GDP, as shown in Table 6.12 Thus the total cost of failure 
in Papua New Guinea amounts to $33.5 bn ($1.7 bn per year) while that of Solomon 
Islands amounts to $2.2 bn  ($0.1 bn per year).     
  
The value of turning round these two fragile states would thus be of the order of $36 
bn, expressed as a present value and $1.8 bn per year. It is worth noting that in 2007 
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands together received $567 million of aid, 
which represents around one third of the annual cost of their failure.   
 
---- Table 6 about here ---- 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Globally, state failure is hugely costly and so warrants serious attention. The policy 
instruments appropriate for addressing state failure are beyond the scope of this paper, 
but are likely to include security, governance and trade policies as well as aid.  We 
have attempted to apply our global framework and methodology to the specific 
context of the Pacific. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses which it is 
important to recognise. Our approach necessarily lacks the richness of detail provided 
by the case-study method. It is best seen as a supplement and complement to such an 
approach rather than a rival. However, we have attempted to discover in what ways 
the Pacific is distinctive from the global pattern as well as the ways in which it 
conforms to it.  
 
Globally, failing states inflict very large costs on their neighbours and this both 
justifies and requires regional intervention in decision processes that would normally 
be the sovereign domain of nation states. One respect in which the Pacific is 
distinctive is that, because its countries are islands, the neighbourhood spillovers that 
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normally generate these costs do not apply. As far as we can discern, islands do not 
have neighbours in this economic sense. Hence, the basis for regional concern is 
somewhat reduced, and indeed shifted from the self-interest of other states to their 
humanitarian concern with the wellbeing of the directly affected populations. The 
second respect in which the Pacific is distinctive reinforces this latter conclusion. 
Although neighbours are not affected by state failure, the failing states themselves 
suffer considerably more in terms of income losses if they are islands. We have 
speculated that this may be because of the greater openness of islands, implying 
greater flight of capital and skilled labour. Hence, the humanitarian case is 
particularly strong. 
 
Finally, we have attempted to put a cost on state failure in the Pacific. This is 
evidently a heroic undertaking and the results should be treated with due caution. 
Nevertheless, our estimate of a present value of around $36bn is so large that the 
implication is clear: state failure in the Pacific should be a major policy concern. This 
estimate of lost output omits costs that are likely to be important both to the societies 
themselves, and globally. Most notably, within societies we have omitted the costs of 
heightened morbidity and mortality, while globally we have omitted costs arising 
from the heightened risk that the failing state will become a haven for pandemics, 
international crime and terrorism.  
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Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for Eleven Pacific States (2007) 
  
Country total population  GDP per capita 
(US$) 
annual growth 
(per capita GDP) 
ODA per capita 
(US$) 
ODA/GNI 
(%) 
East Timor 1,065,900 371 -1.87 203 46.5 
Fiji 838,200 4,095 1.29 56 2.0 
Kiribati 101,900 851 1.36 214 19.4 
Marshall Islands 66,500 2,448 -0.12 1,002 37.6 
Micronesia 111,000 2,313 0.28 980 44.3 
Palau 20,200  8,148 -0.16 1,240 26.8 
Papua New Guinea 6,324,100 990 -1.17 46 7.2 
Samoa 186,800 2,579 2.97 198 12.1 
Solomon Islands 495,400 745 -1.81 230 34.7 
Tonga 100,600 2,298 1.88 240 13.5 
Vanuatu 225,900 2,001 -0.21 196 13.9 
Notes: Average annual growth rate measured over the period 1998-2007, all other figures are for 2007. GDP and ODA per capita 
are measured in current US$. Sources: WDI, 2009 and OECD-DAC, 2009. 
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Table 2: Classification of State Failure in the Pacific 
 
 CPIA average  
1977-2004 
Political Instability Task Force, 2007 Failed States Index, 2007 BMZ, 2007 Uppsala/Prio 
Armed Conflict Data Set 
East Timor n.a. n.a. 93.4 (25) Failed n.a. 
Fiji 3.1 Regime changes in 1987 and 2006 76.6 (87)   
Kiribati 3.2 n.a. n.a.   
Marshall Islands 3.0 n.a. n.a.   
Micronesia 3.0 n.a. 74.0 (97)   
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a.   
Papua New Guinea 2.8 Ethnic war 1989-1997 84.6 (52) Failed Internal minor armed conflict, 
1998-1990 and 1992-1996 
Samoa 3.0 n.a. 72.4 (101)   
Solomon Islands 2.6 Regime change 2000-2003 92.4 (30) Failed  
Tonga 3.2 n.a. n.a.   
Vanuatu 2.9 n.a. n.a. Failed  
Sources and Explanations CPIA scores were provided by the World Bank (World Bank, 2008). 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) data were obtained from http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ PITF defines ethnic wars as episodes of violent conflict between 
governments and ethnic or other communal minorities. There are the two minimum thresholds for including an ethnic war event in the state failure problem set: a 
mobilisation threshold, wherein each party must mobilise 1,000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops), and a conflict intensity threshold, whereby there must 
be at least 1,000 direct conflict-related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year when the annual conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities. 
Adverse regime changes are defined as: major, adverse shifts in patterns of governance, including major and abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral systems to more 
closed, authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites and the mode of governance; contested dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial area 
of a state by extrajudicial means; and/or near-total collapse of central state authority and the ability to govern. The main criterion used to identify adverse regime changes is 
the record of a six or more point drop in the value of a state’s POLITY index score over a period of three years or less. Most of the cases of adverse regime changes are 
identified in this way. Such changes may be accomplished by coup, fiat, or popular referendum. The POLITY index is a measure of the institutionalised regime authority 
characteristics of the central state; the index scale ranges from minus 10 (-10, fully institutionalised autocracy) to plus10 (+10, fully institutionalised democracy). 
The Failed States Index was downloaded from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350. Figures in brackets provide the ranking. 
The Uppsala/Prio Armed Conflict Data Set is available from http://www.prio.no/Data/. We used v4.-2008. 
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Table 3: Recent CPIA Scores 
  A B C D CPIA 
East Timor 3.00 2.61 2.67 2.63 2.73 
Kiribati 3.17 3.00 2.87 3.17 3.05 
Papua New Guinea 4.00 3.44 2.60 2.90 3.24 
Samoa 3.94 4.00 3.87 3.90 3.93 
Solomon Islands 3.00 2.89 2.60 2.53 2.76 
Tonga     2.83 3.11 3.23 2.97 3.04 
Vanuatu     3.67 3.22 2.87 3.17 3.23 
Average (6 Pacific countries) 3.37 3.18 2.96 3.04 3.14 
Average (all countries) 3.48 3.34 3.23 3.03 3.27 
Note: Averages for 2006-2008. Source: www.worldbank.org/governance. 
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Table 4: Growth effect of Failing States, 1974-2001 
 
 OLS SYS-GMM OLS 
 PWT PWT WDI 
 (1) 90% Confidence interval (2) (3) 
Income per capita, t-4 -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 
 (3.50)***   (1.08) (4.61)*** 
Dummy non-Failing States countries at war -0.013 -0.021 -0.006 -0.008 -0.013 
 (3.02)***   (0.83) (2.14)** 
Dummy Failing States at war -0.042 -0.056 -0.028 -0.033 -0.051 
 (4.87)***   (2.56)** (4.06)*** 
Dummy Failing States at peace -0.026 -0.032 -0.020 -0.024 -0.022 
 (6.96)***   (3.64)*** (6.22)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at war -0.018 -0.032 -0.005 -0.062 -0.016 
 (2.20)**   (3.09)*** (1.88)* 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at peace -0.018 -0.026 -0.010 -0.021 -0.021 
 (3.70)***   (1.94)* (4.61)*** 
Constant 0.105 0.070 0.140 0.077 0.090 
 (4.89)***   (2.22)** (6.26)*** 
Observations 600   600 664 
R-squared 0.17    0.14 
Number of countries 105   105 118 
Number of FS 45    49 
Number of islands 19    25 
Number of FS Islands 5    6 
Number of Pacific Islands 2    6 
Number of FS Pacific Islands 1    2 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value)    0.79  
Number of instruments    116  
AR(1) (p-value)    0.001  
AR(2) (p-value)    0.507  
Regression (1) and (3) are estimated with OLS. Regression (2) is estimated with System-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). All right-hand side variables are 
instrumented. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable: Growth rate of real income per 
capita, Penn World Tables 6.1 in regression (1) and (2) and WDI in regression (3). All regressions include time dummies. 
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Table 5: Growth effect of islands 
OLS estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income per capita, t-4 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 (5.16)*** (5.17)*** (5.08)*** (5.14)*** 
Dummy non-Failing States countries at war -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (1.83)* (1.87)* (1.89)* (1.89)* 
Dummy Failing States at war (1) -0.049 -0.049 -0.049 -0.048 
 (3.89)*** (3.86)*** (3.85)*** (3.82)*** 
Dummy Failing States at peace (1) -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 
 (4.98)*** (5.06)*** (4.95)*** (4.90)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at war (excl. islands) (2) -0.015    
 (1.76)*    
Proportion of neighbours being FS at peace (excl. islands) (2) -0.023    
 (4.92)***    
Dummy Island  0.011 0.011 0.012 0.008 
 (2.78)*** (2.74)*** (3.15)*** (1.84)* 
Dummy FS Island  -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
 (2.70)*** (2.67)*** (2.70)*** (2.72)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being FS (excl. islands)  -0.021   
  (4.68)***   
Proportion of neighbours being FS (incl. islands)   -0.021 -0.023 
   (4.35)*** (4.49)*** 
Proportion of neighbours being FS islands    0.023 
    (1.65)* 
Constant 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.097 
 (6.65)*** (6.67)*** (6.57)*** (6.61)*** 
Observations 664 664 664 664 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
(1) probability that the two coefficients are equal 0.01    
(2) probability that the two coefficients are equal 0.35    
All regressions include time dummies. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent 
variable: Growth rate of real income per capita, WDI (2004). 
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Table 6: The cost of failure in pacific islands 
 
 Population 
(in mn) 
1998-2004 
GDP        
(in bn $) 
1998-2004 
Proportion of 
income that is 
lost due to failure 
Cost of failure 
(in bn $) 
Papua New Guinea 4.3 5 6.7 [4.2, 8.4]      33.5 [21, 42] 
Solomon Islands 0.38 0.32 6.7 [4.2, 8.4]      2.2   [1.3, 2.7] 
Total Cost         35.7 [22.3, 44.7] 
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Notes 
 
1
 The only independent country for which data was not available from the World Bank was 
Nauru. 
2
 For a discussion of foreign aid to the region see Feeny (2007). 
3
 The CPIA is one of the possible indicators available to measure the quality of policy and 
institutions, and is therefore likely to be subject to inaccuracy. It has the advantage of being 
available for a long period of time and many developing countries. The ICRG is an 
alternative indicator, which is highly correlated with the CPIA and available for fewer 
countries/periods.   
4
 It is worth noting that the CPIA is not available for East Timor before the mid-2000’s.    
5
 Development agencies typically do not publish lists of failing states, one exception being 
the German Ministry of Development (BMZ). They list four of the eleven Pacific states as 
failed: East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
6
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4930994.stm accessed on 13 July 2009. 
7
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300477.stm accessed on 13 
July 2009. 
8
 The full text of UN Resolution A/RES/60/1 can be found at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement. 
The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity is set out in paragraphs 138 and 139. 
9
 Full text at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf. 
10
 Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) also provide some robustness checks on the 
specification. Including education, investment and democracy in regression (1) of Table 4 
does not alter the results.  
11 We performed specification tests on regression (4) of Table 5. We included alternative 
control variables for education, investment and democracy. These checks suggest that our 
results are robust to the introduction of these control variables. (Available upon request).  
12
 The difference in numbers of Tables 1 and 6 are due to different time periods (respectively 
2007 and 1998-2004).
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Appendix 1: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Clusters  
A. Economic Management 1 Macroeconomic Management 
 2 Fiscal Policy 
 3 Debt Policy 
   
B. Structural Policies 4 Trade  
 5 Financial Sector 
 6 Business Regulatory Environ. 
   
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 7 Gender Equality 
 8 Equity of Public Resource Use 
 9 Building Human Resources 
 10 Social Protection & Labour 
 11 Pol. & Institutions for Environ. Sustainability 
   
D. Public Sector Management and 
Institutions 12 Property Rights & Rule-based Govern. 
 13 Quality of Budget. & Financial Management 
 14 Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation 
 15 Quality of Public Admin. 
 16 
Transparency, Accountability & Corruption in Pub. 
Sector 
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Appendix 2: Island Classification 
 
Pacific: 
East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Fed. States of Micronesia, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. 
 
Caribbean: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
East Africa: 
Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. 
 
South Europe: 
Cyprus, Malta. 
 
Asia: 
Maldives, Singapore and Sri Lanka. 
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Appendix 3: Robustness checks on island classification 
 
Estimations w/o South European and Asian islands. 
OLS estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
Income p.c. t-4 -0.00990*** -0.00995*** -0.00966*** -0.0102*** 
 5.28 5.29 5.14 5.33 
Dummy non-Failing States countries at war -0.0110* -0.0113* -0.0112* -0.0116* 
 1.73 1.78 1.77 1.83 
Dummy Failing States at war -0.0543*** -0.0537*** -0.0535*** -0.0534*** 
 4.14 4.10 4.08 4.07 
Dummy Faiming States at peace -0.0176*** -0.0180*** -0.0177*** -0.0174*** 
 4.82 4.92 4.82 4.75 
Proportion of neighbours being FS at war (excl. islands) -0.013    
 1.55    
Proportion of neighbours being FS at peace (excl. islands) -0.0230***    
 4.95    
Dummy Island 0.00926** 0.00891** 0.0108*** 0.00288 
 2.25 2.19 2.61 0.57 
Dummy FS Island -0.0275*** -0.0263*** -0.0260*** -0.0277*** 
 3.63 3.53 3.52 3.67 
Proportion of neighbours being FS (excl. islands)  -0.0207***   
  4.60   
Proportion of neighbours being FS (incl. islands)   -0.0200*** -0.0233*** 
   4.14 4.59 
Proportion of neighbours being FS islands    0.0438*** 
    3.55 
Constant 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 
 7.43 7.41 7.25 7.45 
Observations 651 651 651 651 
R-squared 0.166 0.165 0.161 0.167 
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